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Abstract
This article examines the contribution of government policies to the
high number of bank failures in the United States during the l920s. I
consider the state of Kansas, which had a system of voluntary deposit
insurance and where branch banking was strictly prohibited, and find
that bank failure rates were highest in counties suffering the greatest
agricultural distress and where deposit insurance system membership was
the highest. The evidence for Kansas illustrates how prohibitions on
branch banking caused unit banks to be especially susceptible to local
economic shocks, and suggests that, despite regulations to limit risk-
taking, deposit insurance caused more bank failures than would have
occurred otherwise.1
Regulation and Bank Failures:
New Evidence from the Agricultural Collapse of the l920s
Government policies that limit diversification and encourage risk-
taking are frequently cited as contributing to the recent increase in
bank and savings and loan failures in the United States)~ Restrictions
on branch banking, for example, limit the ability of depository
institutions to weather local economic shocks.2 Other regulations
prevent banks from offering a variety of products and services that
could potentially lower their overall risk. For example, while the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was intended to reduce the risk of bank
failure by prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in securities-
related activities, recent research has found that banks with securities
operations before 1933 had a lower probability of failing than other
banks .
The U.S. deposit insurance system also encourages risk-taking by
depository tnstitutions. Because depositors are protected in the event
of bank failure (at least to the limit of insurance coverage), they do
not require banks to pay risk premia on deposit interest rates, and so a
bank’s cost of funds does not increase proportionately with increases in
risk.4 As long as economic activity and interest rates were stable and
entry barriers limited competition, however, the consequences of deposit
insurance and limits on diversification were insignificant and bank
failures were few. But increased interest rate volatility and a sharp
recession in 1980-81, coupled with greater competition and deregulation
of deposit interest rates, weakened many banks and S&Ls and encouraged
more risk-taking. The result has been a dramatic increase in the number
of bank and S&L failures.52
This paper offers new empirical evidence on the contribution of
deposit insurance and diversification-limiting regulations to bank
failures by studying the performance of Kansas banks during the
agricultural collapse of the early 1920s. The Kansas experience
illustrates how prohibitions on branch banking caused unit banks to be
especially susceptible to local economic shocks. This case is
particularly interesting, however, because membership in the state
deposit insurance system was voluntary, enabling comparison of the
performance of insured and non-insured banks, and Kansas officials
instituted relatively stringent regulations to limit risk-taking by
insured banks. I find, however, that after controlling for differences
in agricultural conditions, counties where membership in the state
insurance system was high suffered relatively high bank failure rates as
a consequence.6
The Causes of Kansas Bank Failures
Like mast agricultural states, Kansas prospered from increased
demand for farm output during World War I and immediately thereafter.
The increas~ in output prices was accompanied by higher land prices and
the expansion of agriculture into new areas. In Kansas, land value per
acre increased 54% between 1910 and 1920, while in some states the
increase was over 100%. In western states much new land was cultivated
or grazed for the first time, and in a few improved acreage doubled from
1910 to 1920. In Kansas farm land was already widely cultivated by
1910, and so improved acreage changed little over the decade, although
in some western counties improved acreage increased as much as 86%.~
Much of the increase in land value and cultivated acreage was
financed with money borrowed from banks, and from 1910 to 1920 the3
number of banks operating in Kansas rose 30%. In 1920 Kansas had 1380
banks, of which 266 had federal charters, 1096 had state charters and 18
were unincorporated “private” banks.8 Farm mortgage debt increased
55.2% from 1910 to 1920, and the ratio of debt to value rose from 24.7%
to 25.9%.~
The agricultural boom ended in mid-1920 when commodity prices
began a sharp decline: the wholesale commodity price index peaked at 167
(1923-25=100) in June 1920, then plunged to 114 in January 1921 and to
91 in January 1922.10 With the decline in income farmers found it
increasingly difficult to repay their debts, and the consequent increase
in farm loan defaults resulted in bank failures. Across the United
States, areas which had enjoyed the greatest agricultural boom seemed to
suffer the worst downturn, having the highest rates of farm and bank
failure.11 Rural areas and farming states endured disproportionately
many failures: of the 5712 bank suspensions during the l920s, 4515
(79%) occurred in towns of under 2500 population, and the failure rate
in those towns (2.5%) was nearly twice that in larger cities (1.3%).12
Most of the failures were in the middle west and south, while the
northeast and California had very few.13
Alston, Grove and Wheelock identify agricultural distress as the
most important cause of bank failures during the l920s, and Kansas’
heavy dependence on agriculture undoubtedly accounts for its relatively
large number of failures.14 Between August 1920 and August 1926, 119
state-chartered and six federally-chartered Kansas banks failed, and an
additional 94 state-chartered banks liquidated voluntarily.15 Figure 1
illustrates the distribution of state bank failures across Kansas in the
early l920s. No region was immune from failures, although some counties4
had none while others suffered high failure rates. In general failure
rates were highest in southeastern counties and lowest in western
counties, although those with the highest failure rates--Rooks, Kiowa
and Kingman- -were located in the central portion of the state.
County variation in bank failure rates was likely influenced by
differences in agricultural conditions. While all counties endured
agricultural distress, the eastern half of Kansas seems to have suffered
more than the west, Figure 2 illustrates that between 1920 and 1925 the
value per acre of farm land and buildings fell more in eastern counties
than in western counties.16 This measure may understate distress in
western Kansas, however, if, as seems likely, marginal land in that
region was withdrawn from cultivation to a greater extent than in
eastern counties. Much arid land in western Kansas was farmed for the
first time during World War I, and the relatively small change in the
value per acre of farm land between 1920 and 1925 in western counties
might be exp~1ainedby the withdrawal of these lands from cultivation.
Unfortunately, the available data do not permit comparison of land under
cultivation between 1920 and 1925, But Figure 3 illustrates that the
largest declines in total farm land in those years were experienced by a
few western counties.17 More southeastern counties suffered significant
declines in farm land, however, while several western counties had
increases in total farm land between 1920 and 1925. It seems, therefore,
that agricultural distress was generally greater in central and eastern
Kansas, which likely explains why those regions suffered the highest
rates of bank failure.
While agricultural distress was a principal cause of bank failures
during the l920s, other factors also enhanced or detracted from the5
performance of banks in different states. Deposit insurance, for
example, has been implicated in the failures of the l920s. Although
federal insurance did not begin until 1933, eight states, including
Kansas, adopted insurance systems for their state-chartered banks after
the Panic of 1907.18 Calomiris demonstrates that banks in states with
insurance systems grew faster than those of other states during the
agricultural boom, but then suffered greater asset declines after farm
prices fell.19 And Alston, Grove and Wheelock show that bank failure
rates were higher in deposit insurance states, holding constant the
level of agricultural distress.2°
The Kansas deposit insurance system had a number of unique
features, several of which were designed to limit risk-taking. For
example, in response to complaints that insurance forced conservative
banks to pay for the failures of risk-taking institutions, membership in
the insurance system was made voluntary. Since conservative banks could
chose to remain uninsured, doubts about the credibility of the insurance
fund may have limited the risk-taking of insured banks. With neither
the state or conservative banks standing behind the fund, depositors of
insured banks were given some incentive to monitor their banks’
activities, and hence limit risk-taking.21
To further constrain insured banks, Kansas also capped deposit
interest rates and required insured banks to maintain minimum capital to
deposit ratios of .10.22 Further, banks were required to operate for at
least one year and undergo a state inspection before being admitted into
the insurance system.23 And supervision of insured banks was reputed to
have been relatively tight.246
Insured banks were assessed annual premiums of 1/20th of 1% of
their insured deposits less capital and surplus, and thus were given
some incentive to maintain adequate capital. However, because premiums
were so small, the assessment savings was trivial. For example, a bank
with $100,000 of insured deposits would pay $45 per year if it had
$10,000 of capital and surplus, or $42.50 if it had $15,000 of capital
and surplus. The state could increase assessments to 1/5th of 1% if
necessary to maintain the solvency of the insurance fund, and insured
banks were required to deposit $500 in cash or eligible bonds with the
state treasurer for each $100,000 of insured deposits. Banks were
allowed to withdraw from the insurance system with six months notice,
but remained liable for assessments needed to reimburse depositors of
banks that failed while the withdrawing bank was in the system.
In its first year of operation, 48.9% of eligible banks, holding
45.7% of deposits in eligible banks, joined the Kansas insurance
system.25 From 1909 to 1920 there were few bank failures, depositors of
failed banks were reimbursed promptly, and insurance premiums remained
low. Many banks concluded that the expected benefits of membership
exceeded the costs, and membership in the system increased, peaking in
1923 at 65.6% of eligible banks.
Ultimately, however, the insurance system proved a failure.
Between 1920 and 1926 insured banks had the highest rate of failure of
any class of banks in the state: 4.6%, versus 2.3% for non-insured state
banks, and 0.8% for national banks.26 The insurance fund also failed to
fully reimburse the depositors of failed banks. Depositors of only 29
failed banks were reimbursed in full, while no fund payments were made
to depositors of 88 failed institutions. Fully 28.6% of insured7
deposits were not recovered, either through asset liquidation or payment
from the insurance fund.27 Following the failure of the American State
Bank of Wichita, the state’s largest insured bank, in 1923, other banks
began to abandon the insurance system as the prospect of higher premiums
became apparent. In 1926 the state supreme court ruled that banks could
leave without liability for further assessments simply by forfeiting the
cash or bonds they had deposited with the state as a guarantee of
assessment payment. Many banks then dropped out, and although the
system was not closed until 1929, the insurance of bank deposits in
Kansas effectively ended.
The relatively high rate of failure among insured banks suggests
that the regulations intended to limit excessive risk-taking were not
entirely effective. Insured Kansas banks had significantly lower
capital to asset ratios than non-insured banks, and insured banks seem
to have taken greater risks as they approached failure.28 References in
the state bank commissioner’s reports also indicate that some banks
circumvented deposit interest rate ceilings, and that loopholes in the
insurance law permitted banks to attract “brokered” deposits, much like
those offered by S&Ls in the 1980s:29
By many banks the law has been held out as an inducement to
obtain money on time certificates, and which transactions
are really not deposits in the proper sense of the term, but
rather money borrowed by the bank. A provision that the
payment of the deposit should be guaranteed only to the
person, firm or corporation who originally made it~and not
to any assignee or transferee, has been suggested.
The apparent abuse of the insurance system and relative riskiness of
insured banks suggests that counties where a high percentage of banks
were insured likely had higher bank failure rates as a consequence.
Figure 4 illustrates that membership in the deposit insurance system was8
generally higher in eastern counties, including many of those suffering
the worst farm distress and highest bank failure rates. Once
agricultural conditions began to deteriorate and farm loan defaults
rose, inadequately capitalized banks were the most likely to fail. Not
only did the typical insured bank have a lower capital to asset ratio,
but as its capital was eroded the insured bank had an incentive to take
on still greater risk, In the absence of economic recovery, this led to
even more failures.
While farm distress and deposit insurance are among the most
frequently cited causes of bank failures during the l920s, a number of
other contributors have been suggested. Excess competition, or
“overbanking,” is often put forward as an important cause.31 Ex ante,
it is difficult to identify (or define) excess competition, but that
failures occurred suggests that there were too many banks. As economic
activity declined the demand for banking services fell and banks were
forced to retrench or close. The principal cause of the economic
slowdown in Kansas was farm distress, although other factors could have
affected the demand for banking services. Useful indicators of the
demand for banking services in a county are measures of economic
activity. Since comprehensive county-level data on economic activity is
unavailable for the l920s, however, I use the change in county
population as a proxy. Presumably, the faster a county’s population
grew, the greater was the demand for banking services, and the less
likely were bank failures. A declining or slowly growing population
might reflect a weak economy, and therefore a higher bank failure rate.
One argument often made against branch banking is that it leads to
consolidation of the industry and reduces competition. In fact,9
however, barriers to branching may check competition by protecting local
banks from outside competitors. Competition is not limited by branching
restrictions per se, but in conjunction with minimum capital
requirements or other entry barriers, such restrictions can hinder
competition. Eugene White found that branching restrictions and minimum
capital requirements had significant effects on rural banking markets
during the early twentieth century:
In rural areas ... low population density required numerous,
widely dispersed banking offices. Many banks were needed to
serve the growing demand for bank services in the presence
of the strict limits placed on branching, and the number of
these banks was constrained by the legal minimum capital
requirements 32
Like most midwestern states, Kansas was a unit-banking state
during the 1920s, with over 1000 small independent banks in operation.
The number of banks might have been even higher in the absence of a
minimum capital requirement of $10,000 on state-chartered banks.33 In
general, however, rural counties had the highest number of banks per
capita.34 Had branching restrictions been removed, these counties would
have likely experienced the greatest banking consolidation, either
through mergers or failures.
Kansas remained a unit-banking state throughout the l920s, but
other changes that reduced the need for numerous banking offices in
rural areas may have caused bank failure rates to be high in some
counties. For example, it is often argued that as rural roads were
improved and automobiles and trucks became prevalent on farms during the
l9l0s and early l920s, the number of bank failures increased because
banks serving formerly distinct geographic markets were thrown into
competition with one another.35 Small, rural banks became vulnerable as10
farmers found it easier to bank in larger commercial centers where terms
might have been better or where they had other business to transact.
The automobile and improved roads also meant that bankers could more
easily monitor borrowers, and thus profitably service larger areas.
Because of economies of scale, larger banks could force out previously
isolated small rural lenders. Transportation improvements thus reduced
the need for “numerous, widely dispersed banking offices,” and their
impact should have been greatest in rural counties, where the number of
banks per person was the highest.
National banks provided another source of competition for state
chartered banks. National banks were generally perceived as safer, more
tightly regulated and better supervised. The low failure rate of
national banks during the early 1920s probably drew deposits away from
state chartered institutions. Thus, counties with relatively more
national banks probably had higher state chartered bank failures as a
result.
Kansas Bank Failures: Econometric Evidence
To test the alternative hypotheses about why bank failure rates
differed across Kansas counties during the early 1920s, I estimate a
TOBIT regression model of the following form:
Failure Rate = + ~ Agricultural Distress + fl2 Deposit
Insurance Rate + /33 L~Population+ /3~Banks Per Person +
National Bank Rate + e.
Failure Rate is taken to be the total number of state bank failures in a
county from September 1, 1920 to August 31, 1926, divided by the total
number of state chartered banks operating on August 31, 1920, adjusted11
for new entrants and voluntary liquidations between 1920 and 1926
(STFRATE) 36
I also model an alternative variable, the sum of bank failures and
voluntary liquidations, divided by state banks operating on August 31,
1920 plus new entrants between 1920 and 1926 (SUSRATE). Banks
classified as voluntary liquidations include those closing voluntarily
and reimbursing depositors in full, those merging with another bank, and
those switching to federal charters. I suspect banks closed voluntarily
for the same reason that banks failed: insufficient rate of return.37
Loan losses and declining loan demand reduced profitability and probably
led stockholders of some banks to liquidate or merge with another bank.
Other banks likely found it advantageous to switch to national charters
to maintain depositor confidence as state chartered bank failures rose.
Moreover, as the failures of insured banks increased, so too did the
assessments that member banks were required to pay for insurance.
Switching to a federal charter was one way a bank could withdraw from
the system.38
Of the 94 banks liquidating voluntarily from 1920 to 1926, 10
switched to national charters. Six of those had been members of the
deposit insurance system, including five of the six switching charters
between 1922 and 1926. Twenty-five banks closed voluntarily between
1920 and 1926, including nine insured banks. Merging banks accounted
for 59 of the voluntary liquidations, and 37 had been insurance system
members. Overall, 52 (55%) of the banks liquidating voluntarily were
insured, which was somewhat less than the percent of all eligible banks
that were insured in 1920 (6l.5%).~~ Of those switching to a national
charter or merging with another bank, however, 62.3% were insured.12
Thus, relative to the population as a whole, there does not seem to have
been a bias toward or away from insurance system membership among banks
liquidating voluntarily between 1920 and 1926.
I use two variables to measure agricultural distress, the percent
change in the value per acre of farm land and buildings (~LBVAL) and the
percent change in total farm acreage (LiLAND) from 1920 to 1925. I
expect that a county’s bank failure rate was higher, the greater its
decline in farm land and building value or in farm acreage. If risk-
taking banks were more likely to join the insurance system than other
banks, or if insurance enabled banks to take more risks, then it is
likely that failure rates were higher in counties where a high portion
of the banks were insured, all else equal. Thus I include the ratio of
insured to total state banks (DIRATIO) as an independent variable. The
impact of deposit insurance might interact, however, with economic
distress. As economic distress leads to an erosion of bank capital, the
incentive foii~ insured banks to take risks increases. In the absence of
economic recovery, the increase in risk taking will likely cause even
more failures. To capture this “moral hazard” effect, I include
L~XLBVAL*DI, the interaction of I~LBVAL and DIRATIO, and L~LAND*DI, the
interaction of ~LAND and DIRATIO, as additional independent variables.
To capture alternative sources of changes in economic activity I
include the percent change in population from 1920 to 1930 as an
independent variable (i~POP).4° If this variable adequately measures
relative changes in economic activity or the demand for banking
services, I expect that bank failure rates were higher in counties
experiencing relatively larger declines (or slower growth) in
population.4113
Competition effects are modeled with two variables. The number of
banks per person (BANKPOP) is used to test the impact of transportation
improvements on bank failures. If the adoption of the automobile and
improved roads contributed to bank failures, their impact should have
been greatest in counties where the number of banks per person was
highest. I also expect that the higher a county’s ratio of national to
total banks in 1920 (NATRATIO), the higher the rate of state-chartered
bank failure from 1920 to 1926. The lower failure rate of national
banks, coupled with the delays and possibility of not being fully
reimbursed in the event of bank failure, might have led depositors of
state banks to move their funds to national banks once economic activity
declined and failures rose. Thus state banks in counties with a
relatively large number of national banks might have experienced greater
losses and higher failure rates than those located where there were few
national banks.
Regression estimates for STFRATE are reported in Table 1, and
those for SUSRATE in Table 2.42 Equations 1.1 and 1.2, and 2.1 and 2.2,
were estimated using all 105 counties, while Equations 1.3 and 1.4, and
2.3 and 2.4, were estimated after omitting the 23 counties that had
fewer than five state banks. Only three of these counties had any bank
failures from 1920 to 1926, but in counties with few banks the impact of
even a single failure on the dependent variable is large. This is also
true of the ratio of insured to total banks. Three counties had only
one bank. In two, the bank was not insured, and hence the value of
DIRATIO is 0. In the third county, the bank was insured, making the
value of DIRATIO equal to 1. Because a single bank has such a large14
influence, it seems reasonable to omit counties which had few banks.43
As is evident, the results are affected by doing so.
When no counties are omitted, the impact of agricultural distress
on bank failures is most apparent. Counties where the value per acre of
farm land and buildings fell the most from 1920 to 1925 suffered the
highest bank failure rates. As illustrated in Figure 2, the declines
tended to be largest in eastern counties, where the bank failure rates
were the highest. The coefficient on the percent change in total farm
land is neither economically or statistically significant, however,
perhaps because it is an inadequate proxy for the change in land under
cultivation.
Deposit insurance is most useful for explaining differences in
failure rates in counties with five or more state banks, although its
coefficient is also marginally significant in Equations 1.1 and 1.2.
That the point estimates of the deposit insurance coefficient are more
precise when counties with fewer than five banks are omitted is not
surprising. Counties with few banks tended to be sparsely populated and
located in the western part of the state. The average ratio of insured
to total banks in these counties was lower than that of counties with
five or more banks, but the dispersion of DIRATIO was higher since the
influence of a single bank’s membership status on the ratio in counties
with few banks is large.44
While the results indicate that county bank failure rates were
related positively to the ratio of insured to total banks, I do not find
that the interaction of farm distress and deposit insurance
significantly affected failure rates. It does not seem that the effect15
of farm distress was higher where deposit insurance membership was more
prevalent.
The coefficient on ~POP has the anticipated sign and, in Equations
1.1 and 1.2, is economically and statistically significant.45 Counties
with relatively fast growing populations experienced lower bank failure
rates, all else equal. The coefficient on BANKPOP is small and
insignificant, however. If transportation improvements significantly
affected bank failure rates in Kansas during the 192Os, they seem not to
have had a greater impact in counties with relatively many banks per
person.
A particularly important variable for explaining differences in
county bank failure rates is the ratio of national to total banks
(NATRATIO). Counties where state banks faced relatively greater
competition from national banks had significantly higher state bank
failure rates as a consequence. Indeed in Equation 1.1 the impact of a
one standard deviation change in NATRATIO on STFRATE is as large as a
one standard deviation change in L~.LBVAL.
The TOBIT estimates for SUSRATE (Table 2) indicate that
agricultural distress, deposit insurance, and the ratio of national to
total banks were also important determinants of state bank failures and
voluntary liquidations in Kansas from 1920-26. There are some apparent
differences, however, between these estimates and those for bank failure
rates (STFRATE). For example, the coefficient on L~ILAND is significant
when all counties are included in the regressions. It becomes
insignificant, however, while those on the other variables are little
changed, if the three counties with the largest declines in farm land
are omitted.4616
The impact of deposit insurance appears somewhat less important in
explaining the sum of bank failures and voluntary liquidations than
simply bank failures alone. The coefficient on DIRATIO is smaller, both
absolutely and relative to that on L~LBVAL (although not to L~POP) in the
SUSRATE model estimates. This is not particularly surprising, however,
since just nine of 25 banks closing voluntarily were insurance system
members, while banks merging with other banks or switching to national
charters were probably not affected by the deposit insurance status of
their local competitors.47
Conclusion
Many economists argue that the stability of the U.S. banking
system would be enhanced by permitting banks greater freedoms to branch
and offer new kinds of services. Many also argue that the deposit
insurance system must be overhauled to limit excessive risk taking by
depository institutions,
This ~paper reports historical evidence supporting those
conclusions. During the l920s the United States experienced a severe
agricultural shock, but not disruptions to other sectors of the
economy.48 Because banks were not permitted to branch across state
lines, farm-state banks were unable to adequately diversify their loans
into other sectors. Consequently farm states suffered high numbers of
bank failures, while other states had few or none. Ironically, branch
banking tended to be most limited in farm states. In Kansas, as in many
other states, no branching was permitted at all. Because variation in
agricultural distress across counties accounted for much of the
differences in county bank failure rates, it is likely that branch
banking within the state could have lessened bank failures.17
It is also ironic that states where small unit banks were the
rule, were the most likely to adopt a system of deposit insurance.49
This, apparently, was their second mistake. Even Kansas, where
voluntary membership and relatively strict regulation and supervision
probably lessened risk-taking, deposit insurance seems to have
exacerbated bank failures. Holding constant the level of agricultural
distress, counties with a relatively high proportion of insured banks
tended to have higher bank failure rates than other counties. The
results of this paper add further weight, therefore, to the view that
banking system instability could be reduced by removing regulations that
limit diversification opportunities and by adopting reforms that
constrain risk-taking by insured institutions.FOOTNOTES
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Annual Report (1956); and Wheelock, Deposit Insurance and Bank
Failures.”
24 Calomiris, “Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Record,” pp. 21-23.
25 Banks ineligible for membership included federally-chartered banks,
unincorporated banks, trust companies and state-chartered banks not
meeting the other membership requirements. Membership in the system
represented 38.9% of all banks, and 24% of all bank deposits. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report (1956), p. 89.
26 American Bankers Association, The Guaranty of Bank Deposits, p. 34.27 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report (1956), pp. 57-
61.
28 See Wheelock, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Failures,” for balance
sheet analysis of a sample of Kansas banks.
29 Brokered deposits are issued by depository institutions through a
broker, typically in $100,000 lots or smaller so as to be fully insured.
Purchasers of such deposits may have little or no knowledge of the
ultimate issuing bank. In the l98Os some of the most risk-prone and
rapidly growing S&Ls relied heavily on brokered deposits as a source of
funds. As the Kansas bank commissioner believed, it is often argued
that these accounts should not be covered by deposit insurance. See,
for example, General Accounting Office, Deposit Insurance: A Strategy
for Reform.
30 Kansas, Biennial Report of the Bank Commissioner (1922), p. 5.
31 See Bremer, American Bank Failures, and Gambs, “Bank Failures--An
Historical Perspective.”
32 The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-1929,
p. 16.
Sedgwick County, where the city of Wichita is located, had the most
banks in 1920 (45), while Grant, Greeley and Stanton Counties had just
one each. In 1920, 5% of state-chartered banks had total capital of
less than $12,000, and 10% had total capital of less than $15,000. The
par value of the capital of 35% of the banks was $10,000. Kansas,
Biennial Report of the Bank Commissioner (1920).
The correlation between the percentage of a county’s population
located in places of less than 2500 population and the ratio of banks topopulation in 1920 is .68, which is statistically significant at the .01
level.
See Johnson, “Postwar Optimism and the Rural Financial Crisis of the
l92Os,” and the references in Alston, Grove, and Wheelock, “Why Do Banks
Fail?”
36 Data sources are given in the appendix.
White, “The Merger Movement in Banking,” found that bank mergers and
failures were correlated during the l92Os, suggesting that they shared
common underlying causes.
38 Of course, since state banks were not required to belong to the
insurance system, banks did not have to switch to national charters to
opt out. Insured banks that switched to national charters probably did
so both to escape from the system and to maintain depositor confidence.
Some of those liquidating voluntarily, however, might not have been
eligible for membership.
40 Unfortunately there are no county-level population data except for
census years, and some may object to explaining bank failures from 1920
to 1926 with the change in population from 1920 to 1930. As an
alternative I experimented with using the population change from 1910 to
1920. The use of one or the other does not substantially affect the
coefficients of the other variables.
41 As might be expected in a predominantly agricultural state,
population change was highly correlated with farm distress. The
correlation between I~P0Pand ~LBVAL is .51, which is significant at the
.01 level, and between L~POP and i~LA~ND it is .24, which is significant at
the .02 level.42 A likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the model has no
explanatory power was conducted on each equation. In each case the null
hypothesis is rejected at the .05 significance level or higher.
Of course, the cutoff at five banks is arbitrary. I also estimated
the STFRATE model after omitting counties with fewer than 10 banks and
found little difference between those results and those when five banks
is used as the cutoff point.
The average ratio of insured to total banks in the excluded counties
is 0.39, with a standard deviation of 0.352, while the average in the
remaining counties is 0.59, with a standard deviation of 0.265.
Interestingly, western counties tended to have much lower DIRATIOs than
eastern counties. This is true even if non-eligible banks are excluded.
I suspect this regional difference is related to competition, and
Wheelock and Kumbhakar, “Which Banks Chose Deposit Insurance?” find that
a bank’s decision to join the insurance system was largely dependent
upon the membership status of its competitors.
The standardized, or “beta,” coefficient on L~POP is —0.54 in
Equation 1.1, while those on L\LBVAL, ALAND, DIRATIO, BANKPOP, and
NATRATIO are —0.42, —0.11, 0.33, 0.04, and 0.44. Thus, for example, a
one standard deviation change in APOP would produce a —0.54 standard
deviation change in STFRATE. Descriptive statistics for each variable
are presented in the appendix table Al.
46 The three counties- -Greeley, Hamilton, and Sherman- -were located
along the state’s western border and experienced declines in farm land
between 1920 and 1925 of 55%, 20%, and 28%. Greeley and Hamilton each
had one state bank in 1920 (Greeley subsequently had two new entrants)and Greeley and Sherman both had a bank liquidate voluntarily. None had
any bank failures from 1920 to 1926.
Their decisions were more likely affected by the condition of the
insurance fund in the state as a whole since switching charter was one
way of withdrawing from the insurance system.
48 There is a debate as to whether agriculture was depressed during the
l92Os. Holt, “Who Benefited from the Prosperity of the Twenties?”
argues that farmers in general prospered during the l92Os. The evidence
in Alston (1983) and in Alston, Grove and Wheelock (1991), however,
indicates that farmers who had borrowed heavily before 1920 subsequently
failed or suffered severe financial distress.
See White, The Regulation and Reform, pp. 189-204.Figure 1 Bank Failure Rates
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Failure Rate Model Estimates
Dependent Variable: STFRATE
Variable iLi~ L.Z L~.
Intercept —0.15 —0.19 —0.19* —0.32**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
ALBVAL —0. 35** —0 59* —0. 15 —0. 70*
(0.18) (0.39) (0.17) (0.46)
ALAND —0.12 —0.13 —0.08 —0.01
(0.29) (0.63) (0.35) (1.03)
DIRATIO O.l3** 0.20* O.19*** 0.37**





APOP _0.23** _.23** —.09 —.09
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
BANKPOP —0.22 —0.16 0.19 0.41
(0.61) (0.63) (0.57) (0.59)
NATRATIO .~ 0.36** 0.34** O.55*** O.56***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.23)
log like. —9.38 —9.12 5.03 6.11
LR test 29.04*** 29.56*** 16.74** 18.9O**
obs. 105 105 82 82
non-zero obs. 56 56 53 53
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (one-tail tests). log
like, is the value of the log likelihood function. LR is the likelihood
ratio test statistic.TABLE 2
Failure Rate Model Estimates
Dependent Variable: SUSRATE
Variable L.2,
Intercept —0.04 —0.04 —0.09 —0.25*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
ALBVAL —O.4l*** —0.29 —O.41*** —l.O8***
(0.15) (0.27) (0.15) (0.37)
ALAND —O.48*** —O.73*** 0.15 —0.02
(0.19) (0.29) (0.29) (0.88)
DIRATIO —0.01 0.00 0.11* O.35**





APOP —0.01 —0.06 0.00 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
BANKPOP 0.07 —0.02 0.22 0.45
(0.51) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49)
NATRATIO O.46*** O.53** O.40** O.44**
- (0.14) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19)
log like. 14.91 16.36 32.41 34.77
LR test 28.76*-k* 3l.66*** 2O.14*** 24.86***
obs. 105 105 82 82
non-zero obs. 80 80 69 69
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels (one-tail tests), log
like, is the value of the log likelihood function. LR is the likelihood
ratio test statistic.TABLE Al
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: 105 Counties
a mm. max.
STFRATE 0.093 0.117 0 0.500
SUSRATE 0.169 0.140 0 0.600
ALBVAL —0.173 0.142 —0.466 0.236
ALAND —0.036 0.109 —0.553 0.630
ALBVAL*DI —0.108 0.105 —0.356 0.226
ALAND*DI —0.019 0.061 —0.204 0.315
DIRATIO 0.551 0.296 0 1.000
APOP 10.936 27.701 —20.200 184.500
BANKPOP(*IOO) 0.098 0.033 0.026 0.189
NATRATIO 0.197 0.118 0 0.600
Panel B: 82 Counties with Five or more State Banks
a mm. max.
STFRATE 0.108 0.113 0 0.500
SUSRATE 0.169 0.123 0 0.600
ALBVAL —0.207 0.115 —0.419 0.192
LXLAND —0.043 0.051 —0.176 0.077
ALBVAL*DI —0.133 0.096 —0.356 0.155
ALAND*DI —0.026 0.036 —0.164 0.051
DIRATIO 0.594 0.264 0 1.000
APOP 3.659 13.704 —20.200 48.400
BANKPOP(*100) 0.097 0.033 0.026 0.186
NATRATIO 0,188 0.083 0 0.417TABLE A2
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
STFRAT: Ratio of failed state banks, September 1, 1920 to August 31,
1926, to total state banks on September 1, 1920, adjusted for new
entrants and voluntary liquidations between September 1, 1920 and
August 31, 1926. Source: Kansas, Biennial Report of the
Commissioner of Banking, 1922, 1924, 1926.
SUSRATE: Ratio of failed state banks and state banks that liquidated
voluntarily to total state banks adjusted for new entrants,
September 1, 1920 to August 31, 1926. Source: Kansas, Biennial
Report of the Commissioner of Banking, 1922, 1924, 1926.
ALAND: Percentage change in total farm land, 1920 to 1925. Source: U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Agriculture (Washington, DC, 1925), part 1
(county table 1).
ALBVAL: Percentage change in the per acre value of farm land and
buildings, 1920 to 1925. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Agriculture (Washington, DC, 1925), part 1 (county table II).
DIRATIO: Ratio of insured to total state banks as of August 31, 1920.
Source: Kansas, Biennial Report of the Commissioner of Banking,
1920.
APOP: Percentage change in county population, 1920 to 1930 (divided by
100 in the regressions). Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Fifteeiith Census of the United States, Population (Washington, DC,
1930), vol. 1 (county table III).
BANKPOP: Total banks per person, 1920 (multiplied by 100). State bank
totals source: Kansas, Biennial Report of the Commissioner of
Banking, 1920. National bank totals source: Bankers Encyclopedia
Co., The Bankers Encyclopedia (March 1921). County population
source: Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United
States, Population (Washington, DC, 1930), vol. 1 (county table
III)
NATRATIO: Ratio of national to total banks, 1920. National bank totals
source: Bankers Encyclopedia Co., The Bankers Encyclopedia (March
1921). State bank totals source: Kansas, Biennial Report of the
Commissioner of Banking, 1920.References
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